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I. Introduction 
George Washington once wrote, "The bosom of America is open to receive not only the 
opulent and respectable stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and religions".' 
But this was easier said than done. While initially America may have been viewed as a refuge for 
those escaping persecution, today that refuge has been regulated and codified in such a way that 
many of those seeking protection are turned away. U.S. law allows asylum only when applicants 
can show that they have been or will be persecuted "...on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."2 Many of those denied protection 
are women fleeing sexually based persecution such as rape, forced prostitution, torture and 
discriminatory laws and social mores. 
In particular, asylum has been denied to Muslim women fleeing persecution under 
shari'ahi law in some countries because they failed to link the persecution to one of the 
enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.3 These women often face extreme persecution including strict proscriptions on 
dress, behavior, work and educational opportunities and ability to many and d i~orce .~  Trying to 
fit into the rigid refugee definition, many female asylum seekers have sought to fit their claim 
within the "membership in a social group" or "political opinion" category. This has been met 
with limited success. Muslim women fleeing persecution under Shari'ah law, however, may also 
seek asylum based upon persecution on account of religion. 
' Shari'ah, which means "path to follow", is the general source of ethical, religious and legal rules for Muslims. It 
was developed to give guidance to Muslims on how to live according to the tenets of the Qur'an. Khaliq, Urfan, 
Beyond the Veil? An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Convention in the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah, 2 
Buff. J .  Int'l L. 1,7 (Spring 1995). For more information, see infra Section IV, The Roots of Shari'ah. 
This paper will explore how women suffering persecution under Shari'ah law may use 
the religious persecution category to assert a claim for asylum. Section II will start by looking at 
modem U.S. refugee law and the legal obstacles that applicants must overcome in order the 
receive asylum. Section 111 will focus on religious persecution and previous claims to asylum 
brought by Muslim women. In section IV I will examine the development of Shari'ah law and 
explain how a claim of religious persecution can be asserted for actions conducted under certain 
codified laws. Finally, in section V, I will focus on specific examples of Shari'ah-based 
persecution in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and discuss how a claim of asylum may be 
asserted in those circumstances. 
11. Introduction to Modern Refugee Law 
In the early years of the United States, immigration was virtually unrestricted. In fact, 
colonies encouraged immigration by giving new immigrants parcels of land to cultivate. It 
wasn't until after the Civil War that the government began placing restrictions on immigration, 
attempting to deter immigration h m  China and Southern and Eastern ~ u r o ~ e . ~  The Immigration 
Act of 1917 established the first racially based quota system for admitting immigrants and denied 
admission to immigrants from a list of Asiatic c~untries.~ This quota system remained in place 
until after World War 11. 
During and immediately following World War I1 millions of people were displaced. 
Trying to deal with this problem was a priority during the first session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1946.' As a result, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was 
established in 1947. The initial objective of the IRO was to help these people return to their 
home countries? However, this was sometimes not possible and the IRO needed to resettle a 
large number of people in new countries.I0 A few years later the IRO was replaced by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which remains in place today.'' 
The UNHCR drafted two major treaties pertaining to refugees: the 1951 United Nations *.-, 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol) in 1967.12 These two documents provide the framework 
upon which the majority of the world's nations have developed their asylum laws. Based upon 
the definitions in these two documents, the United States Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 
1980, which defines a refugee as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which 
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.13 
Thus, in order to establish refugee status, a person fleeing persecution must prove that the 
persecution is because of one of the five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.I4 
A. What is Persecution? 
Even when an applicant can prove that the conduct is on account of one of the 
enumerated grounds, there are still several other hurdles to overcome. For example, the applicant 
must show that conduct he or she is fleeing amounts to persecution because "the concept of 
persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even 
unlawful or uncon~titutional".~ Unless an applicant can demonstrate that the conduct he or she is 
fleeing is persecution, asylum will not be granted. 
.. There is no universal definition of persecution in refugee law. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status infers from Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that 
persecution is a "threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership in a particular social group".16 This Convention was ratified by numerous 
states, including the United States. It is important to remember, however, that the UNHCR can 
only make suggestions to states. Each state is free to adopt whatever definitions it chooses." 
In defining what persecution is, some states have turned to international human rights 
instruments for guidance. In 1993, the Chair of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board issued 
the Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (the Canadian 
Guidelines).18 These guidelines suggested that references to international instruments may 
determine what constitutes permissible conduct by a state towards women.lg Likewise, the 
Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs published the Guidelines on 
Gender Issues for Decision makers (the Australian ~uidelines).~' The Australian Guidelines 
listed numerous international instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human 
~ i g h t s ~ ' ,  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against womenZ2 
and the 1994 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against women2' as 
sources for determining what persecution is.24 This indicates that violating universal human 
rights is persecution under refugee law. 
In contrast, the United States does not rely directly on international human rights 
instruments to define persecution. However, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
("I.N.S.") did state in an internal memorandum that the evaluation of gender-based claims must 
be viewed within the fkmework of international instr~ments .~~ The memorandum then cited to 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against womenz6, the U.N. 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against women2', and the Canadian Guidelines on 
Women Refigee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related ~ersecution" as international instruments 
that asylum officers should use when dealing with women claimants.29 Furthermore, the I.N.S. 
did state that "[s]erious violations of basic human rights can constitute acts of persecution".)0 
The vagueness of this definition allows decision makers to determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether the conduct rises to the level of persecution. Thus, each federal circuit may apply 
slightly different definitions when analyzing asylum claims. When analyzing existing case law, 
however, it appears that some standards have emerged for what constitutes persecution based 
upon the form that the persecution takes. 
i. Non-vhvsical Persecution 
In 1965 Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act definition of refugee to 
eliminate the requirement that the persecution be physical." Prior to this amendment, the Act 
required that the persecution be physical before asylum would be granted.32 In Kovac v. Z.N.S., 
the Ninth Circuit held that "a probability of substantial economic disadvantage upon an alien for 
reasons of race, religion, or political opinion is sufficient to confer upon the Attorney General the 
discretion to withhold deportation".33 Kovac, a Hungarian living in Yugoslavia, sought a stay of 
deportation claiming that he was a trained chef but the Yugoslavian police had made it 
impossible for him to get a job as a chef because of his Hungarian background. The court 
reasoned that the removal of the word "physical" from the definition of refugee meant that the 
swpe of the definition was broader and could extend to purely non-physical persecution, such as 
extreme economic depri~at ion.~~ 
In order to be granted asylum based on economic persecution, the persecution must be 
severe. For example, the Seventh Circuit denied asylum to a Polish citizen who was terminated 
from his government job but was able to start up his own business and could afford to come to 
the United States on a tourist visa." The court reasoned that since he was able to maintain his 
same standard of living by running his own business, this indicated that the persecution was not 
substantial enough for him to qualify for asylum.36 
In a subsequent case, Borca v. 2.N.S. the Seventh Circuit held that a well-founded fear of 
economic persecution could be shown when there is a probability of deliberate imposition of 
substantial economic disadvantage on acwunt of one of the enumerated grounds?7 In adopting 
this approach, the court specifically rejected the standard imposed by lower courts that required 
the applicant show a total deprivation of liveliho~d?~ The court reasoned that requiring a 
showing of total economic deprivation was more in keeping with the case law prior to the 1965 
Amendment to the Immigration ~ c t ? ~  That amendment removed the word "physical" f?om the 
definition of refugee, making it possible for an applicant to assert a valid claim of asylum based 
solely on non-physical persecution. Citing to Kovac, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an 
applicant could make a showing of economic persecution even if the deprivation is not totalPo 
The court reversed the BTA denial of asylum and remanded the case for consideration under this 
standard. This relaxed standard may be significant to women fleeing Shari'ah-based economic 
persecution because the persecution they face is often severe, but does not always rise to the 
level of complete economic deprivation.41 
ii. Discrimination 
Another form that persecution can take is discrimination. When asserting a claim 
of persecution based on discrimination, an applicant must show that the discrimination rises to 
the level of persecution. For example, the Ninth Circuit denied asylum to an Iranian woman who , -b 
argued that the discrimination she suffered under the government amounted to persecution.42 In 
Fisher v. I.N.S., the woman described three incidents of harassment that she had endured at the 
hands of government agents. The first incident was when she was detained and questioned by 
officers, along with several other women, for seeing a man in his bathing suit at a party they had 
attended. A few months later she was ordered into a car at gunpoint by officers and chastised for 
allowing a few strands of hair to escape from her chador. The officers admonished her and took 
her home. The final incident was when officers searched her father's home, where she lived, 
looking for political dissidents. She was not detained or questioned during the search. Looking at 
all three of these incidents, the court concluded that they did not rise to the level of persecution. 
The court stated that "[plersecution is an extreme concept, which ordinarily does not include 
discrimination on the basis of race or religion, as morally reprehensible as it may be".43 
After the Fisher decision it appeared that getting asylum on the basis of racial or religious 
discrimination would be almost impossible. However, in Singh v. Z.N.S., the Ninth Circuit found 
that Mr. Singh, an ethnic Indian citizen of Fiji, had been persecuted on account of his race after 
he and his family were repeatedly threatened." Because of the threats, Mr. Singh quit his job and 
the family fled their home. Mr. Singh started a business of his own but the threats continued and 
Mr. Singh was eventually assaulted in his business. His assailants were Fijian dock workers and 
gang members. Mr. Singh reported all of the incidents to the police, but they did not respond or 
take any action. 
The court held that Mr. Singh and his family had suffered persecution on account of race- 
based dis~rimination!~ The court justified its holding in light of the Fisher case by arguing that 
Fisher did not stand for the argument that discrimination never rises to the level of persecution.46 +. 
Rather, the record in Fisher simply did not show that the discrimination the applicant suffered 
rose to the level of persecution. In the present case, the court held, there was ample evidence that 
Mr. Singh had been persecuted and thus asylum was appropriate.47 This holding is significant to 
the issue of persecution under Shari'ah law because it opens the door to the possibility that 
discrimination can be persecution if severe enough. 
iii. Prosecution as Persecution 
Discriminatory laws are often the source of persecution for applicants seeking asylum. 
This can present another hurdle for the applicant because refugee law generally does not provide 
protection to those fleeing prosecution for a crime. International law recognizes the right of 
states to establish and enforce their own laws. This is the case even when the law that was 
violated was one "that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstit~tional".~~ 
Although the general rule is that prosecution for a crime is not persecution, there are two 
primary exceptions. Those exceptions are: disproportionately severe punishment because of an 
enumerated ground and pretextual prosecution!9 The applicant in Fisher argued that she feared 
persecution for her religious and political beliefs by the Iranian government because she may be 
prosecuted under Iranian law for violating the dress and conduct rules of the Shari'ah. The court 
held that she failed to meet either exception. In denying her claim, the Fisher court stated that 
she had merely shown that she was at risk for prosecution under Iranian laws that apply to all 
women and not persecution on account of one of the enumerated grounds.s0 It pointed to the fact 
that none of the officers knew her religious and political beliefs when they detained her, so the 
punishment could not be a pretext to persecute her for her beliefs. In addition, the government 
has detained and harassed other women for similar infractions, so there was no evidence that she 
her experiences were disproportionately severe compared to the rest of Iranian women. As such, 
the prosecution was not on the grounds of her personal beliefs and was not a pretext for singling 
her out for persecution. 
B. Agency and Intent 
Recall that in the Singh case discussed above, the persecutors were Fijian dock workers, 
not government agents." Despite this, the Court granted asylum to Mr. Singh based on 
persecution on account of race.52 This demonstrates the principle that the persecution does not 
have to be perpetrated by the government or agents working for the government. For example, in 
In re Kminga, the BIA defined persecution as "infliction of harm or suffering by a govemment, 
or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the 
victim".53 Kasinga was a Togolese woman fleeing forced Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), a 
ritual practiced by the Tchamba-Kunsunto tribe that she belonged to. In her application, Kasinga 
stated that if she returned to Togo she would be forced to undergo FGM because it was a tribal 
custom. Although the Togolese government did not actually participate in the FGM, it would 
provide no protection for her. The court concluded that she had a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of the tribal customs and granted asylum.54 
The purpose of FGM is not to punish or hurt women. It is a custom that has long been 
practiced in Togo and is routinely performed on girls at the age of 15 as a rite of passage.55 Most 
asylum cases involve persecutors that intend to hurt their victims, but this is not required?6 The 
BIA has stated that, "subjective punitive or malignant intent is not required".s7 In other words, 
persecution may be found even where the conduct is perpetrated by a non-state agent for reasons 
other than to punish or harm the victim. 
C. The Nexus Requirement ... 
This leads to perhaps the most difficult hurdle an asylum applicant must overcome, the 
nexus requirement. As discussed above, the refugee definition requires " ... a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion."58 Thus, the applicant must present evidence that the intent of the persecutor 
was related to one of the enumerated grounds. 
The pivotal case describing the nexus requirement is Z.N.S. v. ~acar ias?~ This case 
involved a Guatemalan man seeking asylum on the basis of persecution on account of political 
opinion.60 While living in Guatemala, armed, uniformed guerillas came to Mr. Zacharias' home 
and asked him to join them in fighting the government. When Mr. Zacharias refused to join them 
the guerillas told him to think it over and they would return to take him. Fearful that he would be 
forced to join them, Mr. Zacharias fled Guatemala two months later. The issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether coercion by the guerillas to get Mr. Zacharias to join them was 
persecution on account of political opinion?' The Court answered in the negative, stating that 
there were many reasons why Mr. Zacharias might decline to join the guerillas and many of them 
were not political.62 Mr. Zacharias presented no evidence that he gave a reason for his refusal to 
join or that the guerillas believed his refusal to be politically motivated. Without any evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, to show that the persecution was motivated by Mr. Zacharias' political 
opinion, asylum could not be granted.63 
The Zacharias court hinted that had Mr. Zacharias presented evidence that the guerillas 
would persecute him because they believed his refusal to join them was politically based he 
might have fulfilled the nexus requirement.64 It doesn't matter whether an individual actually 
possesses the opinions they are being persecuted for as long as the persecutors believe they do.65 
When an individual is persecuted at least in part because of a political belief he or she is believed 
to hold, that individual is being persecuted on account of imputed political opinion and the nexus 
requirement is fulfilled.66 
For example, in in re S.P., the BIA held that harm that has been inflicted on account of 
one of the protected grounds specified in the refugee definition for imputed reasons could satisfy 
the definition:' The applicant in In re S.P. was fleeing persecution by Sri Lankan forces after he 
was found in a guerilla camp. He had been kidnapped by the guerillas and was being used for 
slave labor when the army invaded the camp. He was assumed to be a guerilla and was taken to a 
prison where he was held for six months. During his detention he was tortured at least eight 
times, beaten on several occasions and threatened with death at least four times. The immigration 
judge denied asylum, concluding that the army's motive was an attempt to gain information from 
the applicant regarding the continuing civil unrest in Sri Lanka. Reversing the judge's decision, 
the BIA held that although one motive may have been to obtain information, the underlying 
reason for the abuse was a belief that the applicant held political views opposed to the 
In re S.P. involved a refugee seeking asylum based upon imputed political opinion. In the 
BIA's decision, however, it recognized that any of the enumerated grounds may be imputed and 
thus a basis for asylum.69 In cases involving women fleeing persecution under Shari'ah law, the 
persecution may often be due to imputed beliefs. In particular, these women may be targeted for 
persecution due to imputed religious beliefs. In order to better understand how women fleeing 
persecution under Shari'ah law may fit within the definition of refugee, it is essential that we 
start with a discussion of persecution on account of religion. 
.III. Persecution on Account of Religion 
Freedom of religion is not a new concept. The importance of freedom of religion was 
recognized in the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees that, "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereo~..".~~ It received international recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). The UDHR states in article 18 that: 
Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public and private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
Refigee law has also recognized the importance of religious freedom by including it in the five 
enumerated grounds upon which asylum may be granted. Thus, the freedom to practice one's 
religion without persecution is a universally recognized human right that deserves protection. 
A. Forms of Religious Persecution 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook, in describing the 
various forms religious persecution can take, includes "serious measures of discrimination 
imposed on persons because they practice their religion or belong to a particular religious 
comm~nity".'~ The Third Circuit recently granted asylum to a Chinese man fleeing persecution 
from the government because of his Catholic religiox7' The applicant was arrested, detained for 
a week, and beaten by police after he helped raise money for a Catholic church in his village. He 
fled the country after the police showed up at his home with a summons for him. The court 
concluded that the physical harm he endured at the hands of police because of his religious 
activities was persecution on account of religion and granted him asylum. 
In another recent case, Muhur v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit reversed a BIA denial of 
asylum to a Christian woman fkom ~r i t r r ea?~  The applicant was a Jehovah's Witness who 
claimed that she would be persecuted because of her religion if she was deported. The 
immigration service acknowledged that Eritrea persecutes Jehovah's Witnesses, but the judge 
denied asylum anyway. He reasoned that she would not come to the attention of authorities 
because she was not a religious ~ealot . '~  In reversing the immigration judge and the BIA, the 
Seventh Circuit held that an applicant is entitled to claim asylum on the basis of religious 
persecution even if the applicant could escape notice by concealing her religion.76 The applicant 
need not be a religious fanatic in order to be eligible for asylum. She only needed to demonstrate 
that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her religion, regardless of whether 
she could have concealed her religious beliefs or not. The court reasoned that, "one aim of 
persecuting a religion is to drive its adherents underground in the hope that their beliefs will not 
infect the remaining population".77 The court seemed offended by this notion and urged that the 
case be assigned to a new judge on remand due to the "mishandling of. ..[the] claim by the 
rr 78 immigration judge ... . 
B. Persecution Claims of Muslim Women 
Claims of persecution by Muslim women are not a new thing. Muslim women have been 
seeking asylum in the United States for many years. Many of these claims have asserted 
persecution of the grounds of political opinion or membership in a social group?' Unfortunately, 
most of these claims have been denied. The following is a quick summary of a few asylum cases 
involving Muslim women. 
One of the earliest cases frequently cited when addressing the claims of Muslim women - .  
is Fatin v. I.N.S.*~ Fatin involved an Iranian woman seeking asylum because of persecution 
based on membership in a particular social group. She asserted that her membership in a group 
of "upper class ... Iranian women who supported the Shah of Iran, a group of educated 
Westernized free-thinking individuals" made her likely to be persecuted if she was forced to 
return to 1ran." In analyzing her claim, the court cited three elements that must be met by an 
alien seeking asylum based on a claim of membership in a particular social group. The alien 
must (1) identify a group that constitutes a "particular social group" within the interpretation, (2) 
establish that he or she is a member of that group, and (3) show that he or she has a well- 
founded fear of persecution based on that membership.82 
In determining what constituted a "particular social group" the Fatin court relied upon 
the Board's decision in Matter o f ~ c o s t a . ~ ~  In Matter of Acosta the Board stated that a particular 
social group refers to "a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable 
character is ti^"^^. The characteristic that defines the group must be one that the members cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities." The Board specifically included sex as an example of an immutable character is ti^.^^ 
The petitioner asserted that she faced persecution because of her membership in a group 
of Iranian women who refused to conform to the government's restrictive laws regarding 
women.87 In particular, this group included women who found the law requiring women to wear 
the veil, or chador, so abhorrent, that they would rather risk punishment than conform to it. 
Punishment for failing to wear the chador may include 74 lashes, one year in prison, and 
possibly even rape and death. 88 The court reasoned that women with this viewpoint could 
constitute a particular social group because being forced to wear the chador may be "so 
hdamental to [her] identity or conscience that [they] ought not to be required to be changed".*' A. ,. : 
Although the petitioner met the requirements of the first element by demonstrating that 
Iranian women who refuse to conform to Iran's repressive laws and social mores may constitute 
a particular social group, she still failed to get asylum. The court held that she failed to 
demonstrate that she was a member of this social group (element two), and thus did not have a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of it (element three)." In reaching this decision, the 
court relied on petitioner's statements that she found wearing the chador objectionable and 
would seek to avoid it if possible?' She never stated that she would refuse to conform to the law 
or that compliance would be so deeply abhorrent as to be persecution?2 Thus, because she never 
said she would refuse to conform to the law, the court held that she did not belong to the social 
group that she put forth in her petition: Iranian women who refuse to conform to the 
government's gender-specific laws and social norms.93 
A few years later in Fisher v. I N S ,  the Ninth Circuit reviewed a similar case of a 
woman fleeing persecution under Iran's laws and social mores.94 As described above, the 
primary issue in this case was whether the conduct the petitioner experienced in Iran amounted 
to persecution and thus allowed her to assert a well-founded fear of persecution. The petitioner 
based her appeal on three separate incidents that occurred prior to her fleeing the country. Those 
incidents, described above, included being detained and questioned by government officials 
after seeing a man in his bathing suit, being stopped on the street and ordered into a car at 
gunpoint where she was reprimanded and taken home, and third having her father's home, 
where she resided, searched by police.95 The court held that she did not demonstrate that she had 
suffered persecution?6 w at her, she only showed that she could be prosecuted for violating Iran's 
laws if she was deported. Since the punishment she possibly faced was not disproportionately 
. severe or a pretext for targeting her specifically, it did not amount to persecution and she could 
not receive asylum.97 
More recently, the BIA reversed an immigration judge's finding of deportability and 
granted asylum to a Moroccan woman fleeing persecution from her father due to his orthodox 
Muslim views?% In re S.A. involves a young woman who suffered years of physical and 
emotional abuse by her father because she did not adhere to his rigid views of Islam. In 
particular, she recounted tales of her father beating her every week with his hands, feet or a belt. 
On one occasion he burned her thighs with a heated razor after she wore a skirt that he thought 
was improper. She was not allowed to go to school, participate in activities outside of her home 
or talk to strangers. If she disobeyed her father in any way, evenly inadvertently, he would beat 
her severely. Her mother sought help fiom the government but without avail. The petitioner 
attempted suicide twice and ran away from home twice in an attempt to escape the abuse. 
The BIA concluded that the abuse she had suffered amounted to persecution and if 
returned to Morocco, she would likely be subject to more persecution.99 In addition, the Board 
held that the persecution was on account of her religious beliefs, specifically, because they 
differed from the beliefs held by her father.''' The case record indicated that she was abused by 
her father because she refused to submit to his views regarding the proper role of women, which 
were based on his orthodox Muslim beliefs. As such, her case was distinguishable from other 
cases where the court held that persecution on account of gender alone does not constitute 
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group and asylum was warranted.I0' 
In January of 2004, in Swing v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reversed a BIA decision that 
denied asylum to a woman from ~fghanistan.'" The petitioner feared persecution on account of 
the fact that she was a woman who had adopted Western customs and because she was of Uzbek 
ethnicity. The court determined that by adopting Western customs, she was making "a clear anti- 
Taliban political statement", which put her at greater risk than the general population.'03 The 
court held that she had established a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum because she 
presented evidence of the conditions in Afghanistan that supported her assertion of a well- 
founded fear of persecution. 
The court also rejected the BIA's suggestion that a fear of violence that is "part of the 
general strife occurring in Afghanistan" is not persecution under the case law.'" The court 
stated that just because a country is experiencing unrest does not mean that a petitioner cannot 
show a fear of persecution in that country.'05 The petitioner demonstrated that although there 
was a great deal of internal strife in Afghanistan, she was at a greater risk for harm because of 
her political views and ethnicity. Because of this, the court remanded the case to the BIA with 
instructions to reopen the proceedings in light of its decision. 
The women in these four cases sought asylum because of persecution on account of 
membership in a particular social group, political opinion, and religious beliefs. They came from 
Iran, Morocco and Afghanistan. They were persecuted by government officials as well as by 
family members. The persecution ranged from threats, detention, emotional abuse to physical 
abuse. Despite all the differences, there is one thing they all had in common. They were all 
persecuted under Shari'ah law. 
As discussed above, asserting a claim of persecution based on prosecution that one may 
suffer at the hands of the government presents special problems. Refugee law was intended to 
protect victims, not criminals. Where the petitioner merely establishes that "he faces a 
possibility of prosecution for an act deemed criminal in ... society, which is made applicable to all 
people-in the country", that does not amount to persecution.106 This is often the case for Muslim 
women fleeing state sanctioned persecution under Shari'ah law. The UNHCR Handbook 
addressed this problem, however, in paragraph 57 saying, "...penal prosecution for a reason 
mentioned in the definition ... may in itself amount to persecution".107 Thus, if a woman fleeing 
prosecution under Shari'ah law can demonstrate that the prosecution is on account of religion, 
she may be able to establish a claim for asylum. In order to understand how a claim of religious 
persecution can be asserted for prosecution of codified laws, it is important to understand the 
origins of Shari'ah law. 
IV. The Roots of the Shari'ah 
The most fundamental aspect of Islamic law that Westerners must understand is the 
relationship between religion and the law in some Muslim countries. Unlike Western states, for 
example the United States, many Muslim states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, do not view the 
law as a separate entity from religion.lo8 They are intertwined and cannot exist without the other. 
The state is merely an agent, which exists solely to enforce the tenets of the religion through 
law.Io9 Thus, religion precedes the law and the law precedes the state. Religion is the base of 
Islamic culture upon which everything else is b~i1t . I '~  Using the common base of Islam, Muslim 
states have combined religion, history, and their own unique cultures to create distinct legal 
systems that vary widely."' 
Traditionally, Muslims view the Shari'ah as divine in origin. It is a combination of 
Qur'anic rules, the Traditions of the Prophet (Sunna), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and the 
consensus of scholars (ijma).'I2 The purpose of the Shari'ah was to translate the messages of the 
Prophet Muhammad into rules of living for all Muslims. According to the classical theory of the 
development of Islamic law, the first and most important sources of Shari'ah were the Qur'an 
and the Sunna, both divine in origin. The Qur'an is believed by Muslims to be the primary and 
direct source of divine law. The Sunna, which means "custom of the community", when applied 
to Muhammad in the Traditions of the Prophet, requires that all Muslims live as he lived. As 
time passed, the Qur'an and Sunna were not enough to handle the new situations that arose as 
society changed. Thus, qiyas was used to apply the law through analogy to these new situations. 
No rule arrived at by qiyas could contradict the Qur'an or Sunna. The final source of the 
Shari'ah was ijma, the consensus of scholars. Ijma was used to agree upon the fimdamental rules 
of the Shari'ah when there was a dispute. From these four sources, the Shari'ah developed into a 
framework of laws for the Islamic state. 
The dominant theory of the development of Islamic law was formulated by Professor 
Joseph Schacht. This theory, adopted by the "Orientalists", holds that the first source of 
Shari'ah was pre-Islamic rules and customs called "sunna", which were used throughout 
Arabia.Ir4 Arabs had lived under these rules and customs for hundreds of years."5 Unlike the 
classical theory, which holds that the Qur'an came first, Schacht's theory posits that the Qur'an 
did not influence the law until the Umayyad empire (661-750 A.D.)."~ This was when newly 
formed schools of law began restructuring the rules and customs in accordance with the Qur'an. 
Following this, the Traditions of the Prophet began to be written. These traditions eventually 
replaced the pre-Islamic rules and customs, becoming the final sunna. According to Schacht, 
these were the final additions to the Shari'ah. Consequently, Schacht's theory argues that the 
Shari'ah's first sources were not divine in origin, but rather were Arabic customs predating 
Islam by centuries, which only later were changed to reflect the Qur'an and Sunna. 
Despite their differences, both theories assert that the Shari'ah was developed to regulate 
the Muslim community in accordance with the teachings of Muhammad. Additionally, neither 
theory explains how the Shari'ah should be implemented. Consequently, in the millennium since 
the Shari'ah was formed, numerous methods have been developed to implement it."' Some 
states have completely abolished it and have adopted Western codes of laws. Others have 
adopted it, updating it to reflect the values of modem legal systems. And still others have applied 
a stringent application of the law, as interpreted by the state's religious leaders. 
Since there is no single Islamic law, but rather, a variety of legal codes that interpret the 
Shari'ah to reflect the history, culture and politics of that societyii8, each state must be looked at 
individually. In assessing the claims of women alleging persecution under Shari'ah law, it is 
important that decision makers familiarize themselves with the particular circumstances of the 
state the woman is fleeing. Not all Islamic states persecute women. In addition, there are many 
Muslim women who live in conservative Islamic states without any fear of persecution. As such, 
each woman's claims must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The following is an analysis of 
three states which implement some form of the Shari'ah. Each analysis will examine particular 
laws enforced under the Shari'ah and discuss how a woman persecuted under those laws may 
meet the requirements for asylum. 
V. An Analysis of Specific Country Conditions 
The three states focused on in this paper, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, each implement 
the Shari'ah in different ways. Thus, the forms of persecution that women endure under the 
Shari'ah can vary widely. In some instances the persecution may be physical abuse and torture, 
while in other cases it may be widespread and systemic discrimination. Regardless of what form 
the persecution takes however, it is persecution on account of religion and thus, a basis for 
asylum under the Refugee Act of 1980."~ 
A. Pakistan 
In 1979, the government of Pakistan adopted five new laws derived from Shari'ah law 
called the Hudood Ordinances with the intention of conforming Pakistani law with the 
injunctions of ~slarn.' '~ The purpose of these laws was to "criminalize non-marital rape, 
extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol, and 
property offenses.""' Although these laws applied equally to all Pakistanis, male and female, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in practice they have been interpreted in a manner that 
persecutes women and provides them with little protection under the law.''' In particular, the 
Zina Ordinance, which prohibits extramarital sex and non-marital rape, illegal sex acts 
collectively referred to as "zina", has been used to persecute women who claim that they have 
been raped.lZ3 It has also been attributed to the rising incidence of rape in Pakistan and makes it 
possible for women to be imprisoned solely on the basis of their gender.'24 
Since it is illegal to have extra-marital sex in Pakistan under the Zina Ordinance, when a 
woman reports that she has been raped, the report is viewed as an admission that she violated the 
law unless she can prove that the sex was non-consensual. In order to prove that the sex was non- 
consensual, she must provide four credible Muslim adult males who can testify that they 
witnessed the act of penetration.'25 If she fails to meet this burden, she can be imprisoned for 
zina while the male perpetrator often goes free. The maximum punishment for zina is either 
stoning to death or 100 lashes in Typically, however, a woman will be imprisoned for 
several years while the man accused of rape will be acquitted for lack of evidence.''' 
Human rights advocates in Pakistan report that 90% of reported rape victims end up in 
prison'28. Once in prison, women face even more persecution at the hands of the police, prison 
guards and the military. According to a U.S. State Department Report, approximately 62% of 
women were raped by jail officials and 85% were subjected to torture.'29 In addition, it has been 
reported that police officers have threatened women with false charges of violating the Zina 
Ordinance and have threatened them with violence to prevent reports of rape in prison.'30 To 
make matters worse, women charged with zina face great shame and are often viewed as having 
dishonored their families. The stigma attached to the charges, along with the fact that so many 
reported rape victims end up in prison, is a large reason why rape is grossly under-reported in 
pakistan.I3' 
The way the Zina Ordinance has been interpreted, along with the statistics cited above, 
demonstrates that the Pakistani government is either unwilling or unable to protect women fiom 
non-marital rape. The government is also unwilling or unable to protect women inside of their 
own prisons, leading to very high incidences of sexual assault and torture. U.S. courts have 
recognized rape as a form of persecution.'32 Furthermore, the BIA has recognized that 
persecution can be inflicted by persons whom the government is unwilling or unable to 
contro~."~ And given that the Zina Ordinance is based upon and intended to enforce Shari'ah 
law, a woman found guilty of violating it is deemed to have violated the Islamic faith.134 Any 
punishment she receives for this violation is on account of her religious beliefs, imputed or 
actual."' Thus, a woman raped in Pakistan and facing the consequences of the Zina Ordinance 
can assert a valid claim of asylum h m  persecution on account of religion. 
A woman who can show that she faces prosecution under the Zina Ordinance has 
demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. If a woman is accused of zina, there is a very 
real chance that she will be persecuted. Even if she is the victim of rape, chances are that she will 
end up in prison where she will be subjected to more rape, sexual assault, and t 0 r t ~ r e . I ~ ~  This
clearly constitutes a "well-founded fear" as required by the refugee definition.13' In analyzing the 
term "well-founded fear", the United States Supreme Court noted that, "[olne can certainly have 
a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the 
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that she would be singled out for persecution if there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a 
group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of religion.I3' An applicant 
seeking asylum under these circumstances can clearly show a pattern of persecution when 90% 
of reported rape victims are imprisoned.'40 
While prosecution for violating a law is typically not protected under refugee law, there 
are two exceptions that make prosecution persecution. The first exception is when the 
punishment is disproportionately severe because of an enumerated ground.141 The second 
exception is when the punishment is pretextual.'42 The Zina Ordinance falls within both 
exceptions. 
The Zina Ordinance disproportionately punishes women for committing zina while men 
often go free.143 This is because of the evidentiary standards enforced under the law that make it 
almost impossible for a man to be convicted of zina. The reasons for the different treatment 
under the law are the ways in which women are treated under Pakistan's interpretation of the 
Shari'ah. The Shari'ah requires the testimony of four male witnesses to testify that they all saw 
the illegal sexual intercourse in order to convict the man because the victim's testimony is not as 
reliable as a man's. This is derived out of the Qur'an 1:282, which states: 
"And get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two 
men available, then a man and two women, such as you agree for 
witnesses, so that if one of them (two women) errs, the other can remind 
her."'" 
The different weight afforded to testimony based on sex is justified as necessary due to 
the perception that women are emotional and sensitive by nature. Because women are designed 
for the natural task of childbirth and rearing, they are deemed to have been created to be more 
loving and emotional than men. As a result, they may "swewe from reality" when confronted 
with any serious crimes or offenses.I4' The assumption is that this could affect a woman's 
testimony if called as a witness to a crime. 
However, Islamic law allows conviction for a crime based on admission of the guilty 
party. For example, when a woman reports being raped, that report is deemed an admission of 
~ i n a . ' ~ ~  Once the woman confesses to zina, she then has the burden of proving that the 
intercourse was rape by the presentation of four male witnesses.14' If she is unable to do so, then 
she may be convicted of zina based upon her confe~sion. '~~ The end result is that the victim of 
the crime is often prosecuted while the perpetrator goes free. 
The Zina Ordinance is also used as a pretext for persecuting women in Pakistan. Police 
and other government officials have threatened to charge women with zina in order to force them 
into sexual intercourse or have used the threat as a means to keep women from reporting the 
assaults.'49 Charges of zina are also brought by family members to prevent women from 
manying against the family's wi~hes. ' '~ And other reports have indicated that women who 
remany after a divorce are sometimes charged with zina by their ex-husbands."' Thus, there are 
ample examples of the Zina Ordinance being used as a pretext to inflict harm, shame and 
imprisonment on women in Pakistan. 
Once an applicant has met the requirements of one of the exceptions, she must still link 
the conduct to an enumerated ground.'52 This can easily be accomplished in regards to the Zma 
Ordinance because the law has its roots in religion. The Qur'an lists five crimes, called hadd 
offenses, of which zina is one.'53 Hadd offenses are considered the most serious crimes under 
Islamic law because they are regarded as offenses directly against ~ 1 l a h . l ~ ~  Thus, a punishment 
for violating the Zina Ordinance is a punishment for committing an offense against God. 
Persecution that is committed under the Zina Ordinance is clearly linked to religious beliefs and 
consequently, the nexus requirement is fu~filled.'~' 
Women fleeing persecution under the Zina Ordinance can assert a valid claim for asylum 
due to the severe punishments that they suffer under the law, the disproportionate way in which 
the laws are enforced and the fact that the laws are often used as a pretext to persecute them even 
further.'56 The method with which the Pakistani government has chosen to enforce the law has 
left women virtually unprotected fiom rape. As a result, the occurrence of rape has increased, 
women have been falsely imprisoned for committing zina, and human rights violations are 
rampant against women imprisoned in Pakistan. Thus, women who are threatened with 
persecution on account of the Zina Ordinance, or have been subjected to persecution in the past, 
should be granted asylum in accordance with U.S. law. 
B. Iran 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic state run by Shi'a Muslim clerics and 
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indirectly controls internal security forces and the judiciary. Khamene'i became the chief of state 
in 1989, succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the overthrow of the monarchy in 1979. After 
the overthrow of the monarchy, the current government was formed, vesting authority in a 
learned religious scholar. Those legal scholars, Khomeini and then Khamene'i, implemented a 
wide range of laws based on the Shari'ah that regulate almost every aspect of Iranian culture. In 
particular, women have been subjected to harsh discriminatory laws and regulations in marriage, 
divorce, child custody, dress, and their ability to travel freely. 
In 1997 Ali Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani was elected President of Iran. Since his 
election, there has been some progress made in recognizing women's rights. Women now make 
up approximately 60% of applicants accepted to universities, advocates for women's rights were 
elected to the parliament, and women were elected to provincial councils.'58 Despite this 
progress though, there are still numerous laws that discriminate against women and enforcement 
of them sometimes rises to the level of persecution. 
Hejab, the veiling of women, is believed to be fundamental to Islam and a divinely 
proscribed duty of women.'59 Women are considered vulnerable to un-Islamic forces, so they are 
required to cover everything except for their hands and faces to protect themselves and society 
from any temptations. A woman who refuses to wear the veil is viewed to be disloyal to the 
regime and Islam. Using the Qur'an as justification, Khamene'i has authorized severe 
punishments for women seen in public without a veil.'60 This includes fines and lashings, which 
are administered without access to judicial proceedings. In addition, the Hezballhi, a group of 
citizens claiming to be the guardians of public morality, have been accused of harassing, 
detaining and attacking women who fail to wear a veil.'61 The attacks have included knifings and 
acid throwing, intended to maim the victims. The government has done nothing to stop these 
attacks. 
Another way that Iranian law discriminates against women is in the home. After the 
revolution the government repealed the Family Protection Law, a bill that had given women 
increased rights in the home and employment and replaced it with laws based on the ~ h a r i ' a h . ' ~ ~  . - ...., 
According to Khamene'i, the purpose of these laws is to protect the family, the fundamental unit 
of society.16' In reality, however, they took away almost all rights women had in maniage, 
divorce, and child custody. Polygamy became legal again, with men being allowed to have up to 
four wives and as many temporary wives, or concubines, as they Men also can divorce a 
woman for any reason, while a woman can only seek a divorce under very specific 
circu~nstances.'~~ After a divorce, women rarely retain custody of their children.'" If she does 
have custody but remarries, the father automatically gets custody of the children unless she can 
prove he is an unfit parent. In addition, women can only have custody of their children until they 
are seven years 01d.I~' 
The discrimination does not stop at the front door to the home; it also pervades everyday 
life for women as well. The government has enforced gender segregation in most places, 
including schools, hospitals, and public buildings, airports, on buses and in the work place. 168 
addition, over 40,000 female teachers were fired due to their "physical and mental weakness", 
which caused many schools for girls to be closed down due to the segregation laws.'69 As a 
result, many girls in rural areas were denied an education. Segregation has also made it difficult 
for women to work outside the home. When granted permission by their husband, women are 
allowed to obtain a job, but segregation limits their options. 
Despite the numerous burdens women in Iran must live with, U.S. courts have been 
reluctant to grant asylum to them. The two main cases dealing with the asylum claims of Iranian 
women are Fatin v. I N S .  and Fisher v. z.N.s."~ In both of those cases, the court denied asylum 
to the applicants because they did not think those particular women would suffer persecution if 
returned to Iran. The denial of asylum in both cases, however, was related to the specific merits 
of the individual cases. Neither case stood for the proposition that women in Iran cannot be 
persecuted.'71 Thus, using existing case law, it is possible to assert a valid claim of asylum for 
persecution under Iranian law. 
Recall that in Fatin, the court recognized that if a woman's opposition to wearing the veil 
was so strong that she would rather face physical punishment than wear the veil, those beliefs 
may be so fundamental that she shouldn't be required to change them. The court acknowledged 
that women could be persecuted under Iran's social laws if they decided that the laws were "so 
deeply abhorrent ... that it would be tantamount to persecution". 172 However, the court's decision 
indicated that it would only grant asylum to women who refused to conform to Iranian laws and 
thus, were at risk of persecution for their re f~sa1 . l~~ 
The Fatin court failed to recognize that the law requiring that women wear hejab could 
amount to persecution even if the applicant chose to conform to the law rather than face the 
consequences of violating it. Forcing a woman to wear hejab is analogous to forcing a particular 
religion on someone. Hejab is considered a divinely proscribed duty mandated by Shari'ah in 
accordance with the ~ u r ' a n . ' ~ ~  It is a reflection of a woman's adherence to the Islam faith and of 
her moral fitness. A woman seen without hejab is considered disloyal to the faith and un- 
~ s l a m i c . ' ~ ~  When she is punished for violating the law, she is being punished for violating the 
tenets of Iran's version of Islam. 
Even if a woman can avoid punishment under Iranian law by wearing hejab, she 
shouldn't be forced to. In 2004, the Seventh Circuit in Muhur v. Ashcroft, described above, held 
that an applicant fleeing religious persecution should be eligible for asylum even if she could 
avoid persecution by concealing her faith.'76 The court recognized that "[olne aim of persecuting 
a religion is to drive its adherents underground in the hope that their beliefs will not infect the 
remaining population".'77 That is precisely what the Iranian government is doing when it 
persecutes women who fail to observe hejab. Women that object to hejab do not adhere to the 
same version of Islam that is supported by the Iranian government. Even if their only point of 
contention with Iran's interpretation of Islam is the requirement of hejab, it is still a difference in 
religious opinion. The government uses threats, violence, arrest, and shame as a way to keep 
these differing opinions out of society.'78 The only way women can avoid persecution is by 
concealing their beliefs, precisely what the Muhur court reje~ted."~ 
The Fisher court also rehsed to recognize that the applicant had suffered persecution 
under Iranian laws when it denied her claim for asylum.180 The court stated that the applicant had 
failed to demonstrate that she had ever spoken out against the policies while in Iran or that being 
forced to follow them amounted to persecution.181 It relied heavily on the assumption that Fisher 
had not been targeted, but was merely prosecuted for violating generally enforced laws. When an 
applicant is fleeing persecution for violating a criminal law that is disproportionately and 
severely applied or a pretext for persecution, the applicant may be eligible for asylum.'82 Since 
these laws are enforced against all women who violated their edicts, the court held that Fisher 
was not eligible for asylum.'83 
The court made one fatal mistake when analyzing Fisher's claim; it held that the laws are 
not disproportionately applied.'84 The court relied on Abedini v. Z.N.S., which considered Iranian 
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replaced the term "all people" used in the Abedini decision with the term "all women", implying 
that there is no difference.Is6 The laws that Fisher was fleeing fiom only prosecuted women, but 
not men for the same behavior. Thus, they were disproportionately applied against women and 
not men. This indicates that the laws are being used as a pretext to persecute women "for [their] 
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other women were detained and questioned by government officials because they attended a 
party where the male host was wearing a bathing suit.''' She was told that being in the presence 
7. 189 of a man in his bathing suit was "incorrect . The man who hosted the party and appeared in 
the bathing suit was not subject to any punishment. 
Laws that proscribe conduct and limit the rights of women are often justified as 
protecting the morals of society and the public welfare. Women are seen as the weaker half of 
society, more vulnerable to the corruption of outside, un-Islamic f o r ~ e s . ' ~  If they are not 
controlled, women will lead men "off the path", creating social unrest and immorality.lg1 Thus, 
more laws regulating their behavior are required to ensure the safety of the community. 
However, this reasoning does not adequately justify the discriminatory treatment women suffer 
and may in fact be further evidence of the discrimination women face. 
The asserted purpose of Iran's family laws is to return the family to its place as the 
fundamental unit of society and to return women to their natural role of child bearer and 
mother.192 However, the laws have had the opposite effect, giving men almost exclusive control 
over the decisions of maniage, divorce and child custody. Women cannot marry without the 
permission of their father or a male relative.Ig3 Men can have up to four wives at a time and as 
many temporary wives as they wish.194 Temporary marriages occur after a short ceremony and 
can last any amount of time.I9' Temporary wives are not granted the rights afforded to traditional 
wives, such as alimony.196 Divorce is almost the exclusive right of men.I9' Only under very 
specific circumstances can women seek a d i ~ 0 r c e . l ~ ~  After a divorce women may only retain 
custody of children up to the age of seven.'99 However, if she remarries, the father is granted 
custody.200 
When analyzing these laws, it is important to maintain respect for cultural differences, 
but even while maintaining respect for these differences, it is difficult to ignore some of the 
effects these laws can have. For example, the law requiring hejab is often used as a basis for 
prostitution charges?'' Prostitution can carry a sentence of death?02 However, Islamic law 
forbids a woman or girl from being executed if she is a virgin."' To solve this problem, a woman 
or girl who is sentenced to death is married off to a jail official for a night and thus, capable of 
being executed the next day?04 Another law that is difficult to reconcile with its purported 
justification is the child custody law. The government asserts that these laws are intended to 
allow women to assume their natural role of mother, but women are granted very few rights 
when it comes to child If the purpose of this law was really to protect the mother- 
child relationship, it would encourage maternal custody rights, not eliminate them. 
The same disproportionate effect occurs when the segregation laws are applied. Women 
bear the burden for ensuring that unmarried men and women do not mingle.'06 They must ride in 
reserved sections of public buses, must enter public buildings through separate doors, and are 
often discriminated against in hiring decisions because businesses must be segregated.'07 Schools 
must also be segregated and due to the shortage of female teachers, many girls have been unable 
to obtain an education?'' 
Iranian laws place a disproportionately severe burden on women to protect the morality 
and public welfare of the community. The laws are intended to ensure that the community lives 
according to the will of Allah but have the result of persecuting women on account of religious 
beliefs. Since the Qur'an views women as weak and more vulnerable to corruption, the laws 
have been designed to punish women more than men for infractions that both are guilty of. This 
clearly fits within the first exception enunciated in ~ b e d i n i . ~ ' ~  Thus, a woman fleeing 
persecution under Iranian law can assert a valid claim of persecution on account of religion. 
C. Afghanistan 
Women's rights have been a hotly debated topic in Afghanistan for almost a hundred 
Throughout the twentieth century various Afghan leaders attempted to introduce social 
reform that allowed more opportunity to women and girls. After the Soviets invaded the country 
in 1979 some women in urban areas enjoyed more freedom than they had ever had before. 
Women were allowed to hold jobs and attend school and university. While these new freedoms 
were limited to women in cities belonging to the upper class, it created greater expectations for 
many Afghan women for more freedom in the future. When the Soviet-backed government fell 
in 1992 and was replaced with the ultra-conservative Taliban in 1996, most of the freedoms 
women had enjoyed were quickly e~iminated.~" Then in late 2001 the Taliban was driven fiom 
power by U.S. forces and many women hoped that this meant the end of their oppression. 
Despite assurances of more freedom from international actors, very little has changed for many 
women in ~f~hanistan.'" This is especially true for women living under the authority of Ismail 
Khan in the western province of ~ e r a t . ' ' ~  
Ismail Khan first appeared in Herat in the late 1970's when he organized an uprising 
against the Soviet govemment. He continued fighting the communists in the Herat province until 
the Soviets were driven from power. Khan took power of Herat after the fall of the communist 
government and almost immediately implemented a more conservative social order, eliminating 
the social reforms the communist govemment had established and supporting hejab.2'4 He only 
remained in power for three years however, before the Taliban gained control of the area. For the 
next several years he was in a Taliban prison or in hiding in Iran. During the U.S. invasion in 
2001 he worked with U.S. forces to help fight the Taliban. In November of 2001 he returned to 
Herat and resumed power?15 
Since resuming power in Herat, Khan has established himself as the sole and independent 
leader of Herat, rehsing to work with the central government of Afghanistan or to allow officials 
appointed by Afghan President Karzai from taking posts in ~ e r a t . 2 ' ~  The Emir", as he is 
referred to, has used his forces to stop political rallies and protests, arrested dissidents, 
intimidated and beaten opponents and stifled independent media?" Most disturbing perhaps, is 
his use of the police force to monitor the public, especially women and girls, to ensure that they 
are behaving according to Islamic values. He has even instructed adolescent boys to monitor 
people and told them, "You have the right to do whatever you feel is appropriate to have Islamic 
rules met in s~ciety".~" 
After the fall of the Taliban many women thought that they would be able to shed their 
burqas in favor of a headscarf?I9 The burqa is a floor length garment that covers the entire body 
and has only a small screen through which the wearer can see. It is described as very 
uncomfortable and difficult to wear and impedes m~vement?~' Ismail Khan has used the 
government controlled television, radio and newspaper to issue orders on how women should 
dress.22' They must wear a burqa or chadori, a floor length garment that covers the head but 
leaves the face exposed, whenever they leave the house. Many Afghan women have expressed 
the desire to be able to go out in Islamic hejab, which means a head scarf and long sleeved 
clothing, but fear retaliation from the government, employers, school officials and even strangers 
if they do so.222 There have been numerous accounts from women and girls who were harassed, 
threatened and beaten for failing to wear the burqa or ~ h a d o r i . ~ ~ ~  In all of these accounts the 
women were wearing Islamic hejab, but not the burqa or chadori. 
Women are also severely restricted in their abilities to work outside the home."4 
Although Khan has not officially forbidden women from working, he has placed numerous 
restrictions on them.225 He appealed to men to not allow their daughters and wives to work, and 
has accused women who work of moral impropriety. Women who do hold jobs must follow strict 
dress codes, work separately from men, should avoid all contact with foreign men, cannot ride in 
cars with foreign men at all, and cannot ever be alone with a man that is not a close relati~e.2'~ 
There are very few women in governmental positions, and those that do hold government jobs 
are friends and relatives of Khan and his commanders. Women are not allowed to work in 
television or as journalists and are pressured not to work for international NGO's and the United 
Nations. Women are permitted to work only in positions where it is necessary to maintain 
segregation of the sexes.z27 
Even if a woman can find a job, fiuther restrictions make it even more difficult for her to 
keep it. Women are forbidden from driving and cannot be alone with a man that is not a close 
relative, even a taxi dr i~er .~" There is very little public transportation in Herat, so in order to 
work a woman must be able to walk to work or have a male relative drive her. Women are 
forbidden from being in Herat's public parks at night and many women are afraid to go out at all 
at night without a male relative.229 
If a woman is seen walking, talking, or riding in a car with a man that is not a close 
relative she is arrested and can be forced to undergo an abusive gynecological exam to look for 
evidence of recent sexual activity?30 The Herati police watch for men and women alone together 
and confront them. If they cannot provide adequate proof that they are related, both are arrested 
and the woman is taken to Herat hospital. Once at the hospital the woman is examined by a 
doctor for evidence that she has engaged in sexual intercourse recently. Although this law is 
supposed to target only unrelated men and women, there have been reports of women forced to 
undergo examinations even when they were with male cousins.231 The physical violation these 
women endure is only made worse by the severe shame and humiliation that accompanies the 
examination. 
Women are also severely limited from participating in civil and political organizations or 
from speaking freely?32 Khan has taken almost total control of public speech in the media, 
schools, the university and civic organizations.233 Women have been particularly limited because 
Khan has forbidden almost any organization that addresses women's rights?34 Women who 
speak out against the government and its policies are publicly and privately chastised?35 Women 
have been forbidden from speaking to journalists about women's rights and those that did were 
fired from their jobs or threatened.236 The only women's organization in Herat with any 
involvement in the government is the Women's ~ h u r a . ~ ~ '  Khan allowed the formation of the 
shura after intense international pressure, but has maintained rigid control over it. He picked the 
leadership of the shura, defined its mission and limited the subjects the shura could addressF3' 
Initially many Herati women were excited about the prospects of the shura, but most quickly 
became disappointed and stopped participating.239 
The result of Khan's rule over Herat has been the almost complete and total control of 
every aspect of women's lives. Women are instructed on what they can wear, whom they can 
associate with, what they can say, where they can go and when, and the jobs they may take. 
These rules have violated the human rights of women and denied them any dignity.240 All of 
these restrictions have been required in the name of Islamic morals. Thus, where these 
restrictions amount to persecution, an Afghan woman can assert a valid claim of asylum on 
account of religious persecution?41 
In order to support a claim for asylum, an Afghan woman must first demonstrate that 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution?42 Depending on her personal circumstances, this 
may be done in several ways. I will analyze the current restrictions placed on women in the Herat 
region of Afghanistan and explain how they can amount to persecution. However, this analysis 
should not be taken as a statement that all women in Herat suffer under these same 
circumstances. Conditions vary widely for women in Afghanistan based on education, social 
class, marital status and numerous other factors. The following discussion is intended only to 
illustrate how potential claims could be brought. 
The proscriptions Afghan women face under Ismail Khan's regime in regards to access to 
employment may constitute economic persecution. An applicant can show a well-founded fear of 
economic persecution when there is a probability of deliberate imposition of substantial 
economic disadvantage on account of one of the enumerated grounds.243 The restrictions placed 
on women under Khan's regime amount to a deliberate imposition of substantial economic 
disadvantage on account of religion. Because they are Islamic women, they are forbidden to ride 
in cars with foreign men or be alone with men they are not related to. This can make it very 
difficult for women to work for international organizations. During the summer of 2002 Khan 
held two meetings with Afghan women working for international organizations. At those 
meetings he told the women, "It is not good that you are working with foreigners. You are 
Islamic girls and you shouldn't work with f~reigners."~" He has also accused women who work 
with international organizations of moral impropriety.245 The Herat police have also harassed 
women who work with these groups. Police target women seen shaking hands with or speaking 
with foreign men.246 
The persecution is not limited to women who work for international organizations. There 
are many reports of women in Afghanistan unable to obtain jobs that they are qualified for 
simply because they are women.247 For example, women are not allowed to work as journalists 
or in most government positions. Women who are trained as lawyers or engineers are not 
allowed to practice their trade, although they may use the degree to obtain a teaching position. 
Khan uses the Qur'an to justify the limitations on the jobs available to women. The Qur'an states 
that although a woman is permitted to work outside of the home, the job must be a lawful job 
that suits the nature of the woman.248 For example, women should not work in physically 
demanding jobs such as industry, combat, maintenance, or construction. Women are considered 
weaker in comparison to men and events such as menses, pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing all 
make a woman less qualified than a man to take care of household finances.249 Thus, men are 
given the responsibility for running the household. As the Qur'an stated at 4:34: 
"Men are protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made the one of them 
to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means."250 
Based on these and similar statements, some fundamental Islamic states have severely limited the 
opportunities women have outside of the home. Khan uses Islam as a justification for his 
persecution of women. 
In order to show persecution, the applicant will have to demonstrate that the restrictions 
she faces on employment are so severe that they prevent her from obtaining any other position 
commensurate with her education and experience.25' For many women this will be impossible. 
Under the Taliban women were not allowed to go to school or work, so most women have little 
or no education that qualifies them for a job. However, there are a limited number of women 
who were able to obtain an education outside of Afghanistan or prior to the Taliban regime. 
These women may be able to demonstrate that the current restrictions on them are so severe that 
it amounts to persecution. 
In order to make a showing of persecution under the employment restriction, the 
petitioner will still need to demonstrate that the restrictions are on account of an enumerated 
ground?52 For example, a petitioner may attempt to show that she belongs to a particular social 
group that includes Afghan women who feel so strongly about working outside the home that 
being forbidden f?om doing so is persecution.253 Following the decision in Fatin, however, the 
petitioner may have to show that her feelings are so strong that she is willing to violate the law 
and risk persecution?" 
Afghan women can also assert a claim of persecution based on the practice of forced 
gynecological examinations. The practice of forced gynecological examinations on women and 
girls seen talking to or in the company of strange men is perhaps the most compelling evidence 
of state sponsored persecution in Herat. The forced examinations are a form of sexual assault and 
are persecution just as much as a beating or arbitrary confinement would be. They are cruel, 
inhuman and degrading and can lead to great humiliation for the woman subjected to it and her 
family. The examinations are being used to threaten women into submission and as a tool to 
enforce Khan's directives. A woman seen talking to a man that she is not related to, even in a 
working environment, is subject to this treatment. Because of the serious nature of this threat, 
many women have been intimidated into avoiding the public sphere, including work. 
The restrictions imposed on women are enforced according to an extreme version of 
Shari'ah practiced in Afghanistan. Ismail Khan uses religious justifications to support his edicts 
and tyranny over women. He accuses women who work outside the home of moral impropriety. 
He encourages private citizens to stop unmarried men and women who are together and beat 
them because, "[alccording to Islam, you are obliged to beat them".255 He has also established a 
vice squad of police that monitors Herat for moral violations and beats people who are acting 
immoral1 y. 
An applicant seeking to advance a claim based on religious persecution can argue that the 
rules enforced by Khan force a particular brand of Islam inconsistent with the applicant's beliefs. 
The Seventh Circuit recently held that an applicant is entitled to claim asylum on the basis of 
religious persecution even if the applicant could escape notice by concealing her religion.256 
Here, a woman could avoid persecution if she followed all of the rules and essentially adopted 
Khan's fundamentalist version of Islam. There are probably women in Afghanistan that would 
happily do so. The purpose of the persecution and all of the restrictions is to force a particular 
version of Islam on the population and to stifle any speech or actions that might create dissent. 
This is precisely the threat that the Seventh Circuit acknowledged when it supported an 
applicant's right to practice her religion free from the threat of persecution.257 
VI. Conclusion 
Women fleeing persecution under Shari'ah law have had little success getting asylum up 
until now due to the misunderstanding of the relationship between Islam and the law in many 
Muslim countries. Shari'ah law was developed through Islam as a means to enforce the tenets of 
the religion and ensure that the society lived according to Allah's will. As such, persecution that 
occurs through and under these laws is persecution on account of religion. Women who deviate 
from the laws and social norms of Islam are viewed as corrupt and u n - ~ s l a m i c . ~ ~ ~  Their 
punishment is not only often proscribed by the Qur'an and Shari'ah, but is often demanded by 
the government to stifle dissent and alternative interpretations of Islam. Persecution under these 
circumstances is clearly persecution on account of religion and fits within the rehgee 
definition.259 
The courts must recognize that Islamic societies vary significantly from the west in 
regards to the doctrine of separation of church and state. What appears to be secular law on its 
face often is derived from long held religious beliefs. In analyzing the claims of Muslim women, 
decision makers should be sensitive to these differences and consider the history, religion and 
culture of the region in rendering their decisions. Muslim women should not be denied asylum 
that they are legally entitled to due to a lack of cultural understanding on the part of immigration 
officers and judges. 
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